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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the influence of the introduction of a corporate governance code in 2005 on the levels of compliance 
with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) as a leading stock exchange 
in the Middle East. Using a disclosure index derived from mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements for the fiscal year 2007, this 
study measures the levels of compliance by a sample of 75 non-financial companies listed on the focus stock exchange. This study 
extends the financial reporting literature and the emerging markets disclosure literature by being the first to investigate the 
influence of corporate governance requirements for best practices on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on the EGX. Results provide evidence of the lack of influence of corporate governance best 
practices on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements as it is not yet part of the cultural values 
within the Egyptian context. These findings are consistent with the notions of the proposed theoretical foundation. 
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1. Introduction 
Across the globe a series of events over the last two decades placed corporate governance at the top of the agenda for 
business communities, international financial institutions, governments, and capital market regulators. Specifically, 
these were the Asian financial crisis and the high-profile corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, Lehman 
Brothers and Tyco. Furthermore, in academia, the topic continues to attract much attention from researchers (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Brown 2007; Ezat & El-Masri, 2008; Felo, 2009; 
Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). Corporate governance is concerned with the 
system of directing and controlling companies, and it is the responsibility of BOD (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). 
It is a fundamental element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence 
(OECD, 2004). ''Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined'' (OECD, 2004: 11). The BOD actions are subject to laws, regulations and shareholders in general meeting 
and the role of shareholders in governance is to appoint the directors and auditors and to make sure that the governance 
structure is appropriate (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). 
 
The development of corporate governance is a global phenomenon, influenced by legal, cultural, ownership, and other 
structural differences (Mallin, 2009), but as yet there is no widely accepted paradigm or theoretical foundation in its 
respect (Tricker, 2009). For transitional economies, good corporate governance practice may be essential to guarantee 
the success of their reform programmes and to create a healthy investment climate. However, the corporate governance 
codes for best practice were initiated in developed countries and only recently introduced in developing ones. Hence, 
its contribution towards enhancing capital market performance in such countries is subject to the extent to which the 
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conditions for robust governance practice are consistent with the existing values, past experiences and the needs of all 
parties involved in the financial reporting process. It is expected, therefore, to be some time before the impact of 
applying corporate governance can be measured in developing contexts as this needs to develop, and favourable 
attitudes and belief must be formed as well as efforts being made to develop the human resource capabilities to apply 
corporate governance requirements for best practice. 
 
The careful review of the Egyptian modern history demonstrates that the Arab Republic of Egypt has always been the 
regional leading reformer. The harmonisation of the Egyptian Accounting Standards with IASs/IFRSs began with the 
launch of the government’s economic reform and structural adjustment programme in the early 1990s which 
commenced under pressure from the international institutions specifically the WB and the IMF as a condition of their 
providing financial support to Egypt (Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). Mandating IFRSs 
enabled Egypt to access international exchanges, saved time and effort needed for developing national standards from 
scratch, improved fairness of financial statements prepared by Egyptian companies (Samaha & Dahawy, 2011: 63). 
The Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges currently referred to as the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) are among the 
oldest stock exchanges worldwide, the latter being developed in 1888 and the former in 1903. For almost 40 years they 
experienced stagnation during the nationalisation regime until they were revitalised in 1992 as one entity with two 
trading floors (CIPE, 2003; Desoky, 2009). 
 
The new listing rules issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2002 aimed to enhance the implementation of 
corporate governance best practice by listed companies, and include comprehensive disclosure requirements (Articles 
12 to 19), and detailed requirements for financial statements preparation and presentation (Articles 20 to 33). Article 4 
requires the presentation of complete information about the company’s board members. Additionally, Articles 34 and 
35 indicate delisting rules which compel publicly-listed companies to make a commitment to disclosure requirements, 
or to risk delisting. The application of the aforementioned listing rules resulted in delisting of 99 non-compliant 
companies in 2003 (ROSC, 2004).  
 
The assessment of corporate governance practices in the Egyptian Capital Market by the WB in 2004 revealed that 
Egypt applied 82% of the OECD principles (ROSC, 2004), indicating improvements over time. The major areas of 
improvement include: basic shareholders’ rights, cost/benefit of voting, and disclosure standards (ROSC, 2004). The 
first Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) was introduced in 2005. This code is based on the OECD 
corporate governance principles. The code indicates that its rules should be considered as an addition to the corporate-
related provisions stated under various laws as well as the executive regulations and decrees regarding their 
implementation. The ECCG rules are neither mandatory nor legally binding; rather, they promote and regulate 
responsible and transparent behaviour in managing corporations according to international best practice and aim to 
ensure equilibrium between various party interests (Dahawy, 2007; GAFI, 2007; UNCTAD, 2007; Samaha & Dahawy, 
2011). 
 
A number of studies have been conducted in the last decade for the purpose of investigating the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure practices in different countries (e.g., Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Gul & Leung, 2004; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Felo, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 
2010a,b;  Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011; Abed et al., 2011; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011). However, 
to the best of the researcher’s knowledge this study is the first to examine the influence of corporate governance 
structures (namely, board independence, board leadership, board size and ownership structure) on the overall 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. As disclosure lies at the core of all 
corporate governance statutes and codes, investigating the association between corporate governance structures and the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is expected to enrich financial disclosure as well as corporate 
governance literature. 
 
This paper addresses three research questions: (i) what is the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on the EGX?; (ii) how could differences in the levels of compliance with the IFRSs 
be explained by corporate governance structures?; (iii) to what extent do institutional isomorphism theory, cultural 
theories and economic-based theories help to explain the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements within the Egyptian context? 
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In order to answer the above mentioned research questions, the remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: A 
literature review is provided in Section 2. Section 3 develops and formulates research hypotheses. Section 4 describes 
sample selection, data collection, and research methods. Results and analysis are presented in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Formulation of Research Hypothesis 
Financial disclosure is a rich field of empirical enquiry (Healy & Palepu, 2001). More recently, researchers became 
more concerned with investigating the issue of adopting a unified set of accounting standards worldwide. This line of 
research is concerned with investigating the applicability of full compliance with the IFRSs and the association 
between levels of compliance with the IFRSs and disclosure environment attributes. The importance of evaluating the 
levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements is proved by the findings of this line of research which 
reports the absence of de facto compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in emerging markets (e.g., 
Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Glaum & Street, 2003; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005; Samaha, 2006; Dahawy & 
Conover, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). 
For emerging capital markets good corporate governance practices may be essential for a sound success of their 
reform programmes and for reserving a healthy investment environment. Following a series of events that took place 
over the last two decades addressed by the Asian financial crisis and the wide spread of high-profile corporate 
scandals such as WorldCom and Enron, empirical research into accounting disclosure practices particularly in 
emerging capital markets began to consider the impact of corporate governance structures on disclosure practices in 
transitional economies. The development of corporate governance is a global occurrence thus is influenced by legal, 
cultural, ownership and other structural differences (Mallin, 2009: 13). To date corporate governance does not have a 
widely accepted paradigm or theoretical foundation (Tricker, 2009: 233). Transparency, fairness and accountability 
are the core values of corporate governance. Stemming from the desire to enhance access to more capital that is 
necessary to achieve economic development and globalise their economies, corporate governance practices have been 
brought in the spotlight in developing countries. In this regard many researchers highlight the influence of corporate 
board characteristics and ownership structure (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003, Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 
2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b) on disclosure practices of companies listed on emerging stock exchanges. However, I 
suggest that as corporate governance was initiated in developed countries and as it is newly introduced in developing 
countries, its contribution to enhancing capital markets' performance is subject to the extent to which the requirements 
for good corporate governance practices are consistent with the existing values, past experiences and the needs of all 
parties involved in the financial reporting process. Otherwise, it is expected to take some time until the impact of 
corporate governance can be measured. This is because it needs developing an understanding, forming a favourable 
attitude and belief and developing the skills required to apply corporate governance best practice. 
3. Development of Hypotheses 
This section illustrates the development of the research hypotheses formulated to examine the influence of board of 
directors (BOD) characteristics (BOD independence, BOD leadership and BOD size) and ownership structure 
(government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private ownership ratio and public ownership ratio) on the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. Additionally, the section illuminates 
those variables to be used as control variables (company size, profitability, gearing, liquidity, type of business activity, 
and type of audit firm) as identified in previous research as being associated with financial disclosure practices and 
compliance. In each case expectation is stated based on prior literature. 
3.1. Board Independence 
Board independence is an outcome of the number of independent directors in the board of directors (BOD). Board 
independence is an important governance mechanism that is supported by corporate governance reforms in Egypt 
(Samaha and Dahawy, 2010, 2011). The lack of empirical evidence with respect to the association between board 
independence and levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements within the Egyptian context 
supports the need for further investigation.  
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Findings of prior research that examined the association between board independence and financial disclosure are 
mixed which makes it difficult to predict the relationship between board independence and levels of compliance with 
the IFRSs in the scrutinised context. Some researchers report a positive relationship (e.g., Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Abdelsalam & Elmasry, 2008; Ezat & Elmasry, 2008; Felo, 
2009). In contrast, some researchers report a negative relationship (Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & Leung, 2004; Muslu, 
2005) while other researchers did not find any relationship (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). 
Accordingly, the first research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H1: There is no relationship between BOD independence and the extent of compliance with the IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. 
3.2. Board Leadership 
Board leadership is a governance issue that concerns with whether the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the Chair 
of the board of directors. Separating the two positions has the potential to improve the monitoring function of the 
board and to reduce the advantages gained by withholding information, hence to improve the quality of reporting 
(Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). Combining both roles reduces the availability of independent evaluation of the CEO's 
performance as the CEOs themselves will select which information to be provided to other directors (Jensen, 1993). In 
addition, role duality creates a strong individual power base that could impair board independence thus the 
effectiveness of its governing function may be compromised (Abdelsalam & Elmasry, 2008). The results of prior 
research investigated the association between board leadership and levels of financial disclosure are mixed. Some 
studies show that role duality is significantly associated with a lower level of financial disclosure (e.g., Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Gul & Leung, 2004; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Abdelsalam & Elamasry, 2008) while Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006) report an insignificant relationship. On the other hand, some empirical research show that there is no 
association between role duality and financial disclosure or reporting quality (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006) and one study (Felo, 2009) reports a positive relationship between role duality and financial 
disclosure practices. The contradictory nature of these results raises the need to re-examine this relationship and make 
it difficult to predict the type of the relationship between board leadership and levels of compliance with the IFRSs in 
the scrutinised MENA capital markets. Accordingly, the second research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H2: There are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with the IFRSs disclosure 
requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and the Chair and those that do not. 
3.3. Board Size 
Board size is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that help in aligning management and shareholder interests 
(Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). Good governance practices recommend limitations to the size 
of the BOD (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005), but there is no general consensus on the optimum. Findings from previous 
research into the association between board size and levels of financial disclosure are mixed. Some researchers report 
a positive relationship (Barako et al., 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). However, others find no 
association (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Abed et al., 2011). The contradictory nature of these results and the non-
availability of a study that investigates the association between board size and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context make it difficult to predict the type of the relationship between board 
size and levels of compliance with IFRSs. Accordingly, the third research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H3: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD size and the extent of compliance with the IFRSs 
disclosure requirements. 
3.4. Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is defined by Denis & McConnell (2003: 3) as ‘‘The identities of a firm's equity holders and the 
sizes of their positions’’. The ownership structure of a firm may be a possible determinant of its disclosure practices 
(Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). High levels of concentration of capital may be accompanied by the 
owner’s considerable involvement in the firm’s management, which in turn may lead to unrestricted access to 
information, thus may limit the demand hence the supply for company information and vice versa (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008). On the other hand, when share ownership is widely held, the 
potential for conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent is greater than in closely held companies. As a 
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result, disclosure is likely to be greater in widely held companies to enable the principal to effectively monitor whether 
his/her economic interests are optimised and whether the agent acts in the best interests of the principal as an owner of 
the firm ( Chen & Gray, 2002). Based on the review of the patterns of ownership structure in the scrutinised 
companies and the availability of ownership structure related data for these companies, this study examines the 
influence of ownership structure on the levels of compliance with the IFRSs in the Egyptian context using four distinct 
measures; government ownership (defined as the percentage of company shares owned by the government), 
management ownership (defined as the percentage of company shares owned by company management), private 
ownership (defined as the percentage of company shares owned by private shareholders) and public ownership 
(defined as the percentage of  company shares owned by the free float that is less than 5%). 
3.4.1. Government ownership 
 
The results of prior studies that examined the association between government ownership and levels of financial 
disclosure are mixed. For instance, Eng & Mak, (2003) report a positive relationship while Naser et al. (2006) report a 
negative relationship and Ghazali & Weetman (2006) find a negative but insignificant relationship. Accordingly, built 
on the above discussion research hypothesis (4a) can be stated as follows: 
H4a: There is no significant statistical relationship between government ownership ratio and the extent of 
compliance with the IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
3.4.2. Management Ownership 
 
The results of the majority of prior studies that examined the association between management ownership and levels 
of financial disclosure show a negative association (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). Thus, the effect of management ownership on levels of compliance 
with the IFRSs is expected to be substitutive. Accordingly, research hypothesis (4b) can be stated as follows: 
H4b: There is a significant negative statistical relationship between management ownership ratio and the levels of 
compliance with the IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
3.4.3. Private Ownership 
 
Similar to government ownership, there is no consensus among prior researchers regarding the influence of private 
ownership on the levels of compliance with financial disclosure requirements. Some researchers report that private 
ownership may be a complementary (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). On the contrary, some researchers report that 
concentrated ownership and financial disclosure are substitutes (dominance of private shareholders reduces levels of 
financial disclosure) such as Naser et al. (2006) while others report no association between the dominance of private 
ownership and levels of financial disclosure (Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 2000). Accordingly, research hypothesis (4c) 
can be stated as follows: 
H4c: There is no statistically significant relationship between private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
3.4.4. Public Ownership 
 
The results of most prior studies show a positive association between public ownership and levels of financial 
disclosure (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). However, Al-Akra et al. 
(2010b) results support the existence of a significant negative association and Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a) findings do not support the existence of any association between public ownership ratio and the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs. Accordingly, research hypothesis 4d can be stated as follows: 
H4d: There is no significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
3.5. Control Variables 
Based on the findings of prior researchers (Eng & Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Aksu & Kosdag, 2006 and Naser et 
al., 2006) firm size is included as a control variable and a positive association between firm size and levels of 
Hassaan /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science Vol 2, No 1, 2013 ISSN:2147-4478 
12 
 
compliance with the IFRSs disclosure requirements is anticipated. Evidence relating to the association between firm 
profitability and levels of financial disclosure is mixed. Some studies report a positive association between these 
variables (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006), while others report a significant negative association 
between them (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; Wallace and Naser, 1995). Consequently, the direction of the relationship 
between profitability and compliance with the IFRSs is unpredictable.  
 
Evidence from prior research on the association between firm liquidity and levels of financial disclosure is mixed. 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) report a positive relationship. In contrast, Naser et al. (2002) find a negative relationship. 
Consequently, liquidity is used in this study as a control variable, recognising that the direction of the relationship 
between company liquidity and compliance levels is unpredictable. 
 
Evidence regarding the association between gearing and level of financial disclosure is mixed. Some studies report a 
positive relationship (Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006), whilst others find a negative relationship 
(Zarzeski, 1996; Eng & Mak, 2003). Consequently, gearing is employed in this study as a control variable, recognising 
that the direction of the relationship between the two variables is unpredictable. Based on the evidence provided by 
prior research that the type of business activity influences its disclosure practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), type of 
business activity will be employed in this study as a control variable.  
 
Based on the evidence provided by prior research that there is a relationship between the type of auditor and levels of 
company disclosure (Glaum & Street 2003), type of auditor will be employed in this study as a control variable and it 
is expected that auditing by a big 4 audit firm has a positive impact on the levels of compliance with the IFRSs. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The annual reports of 2007 for the entire population of non-financial companies listed on the EGX (145 companies) 
formed the study population. Financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies were excluded because 
their reports are not comparable with those of non-financial companies as they are subject to other disclosure 
requirements. Then the following two criteria were applied: The company should have a complete annual report for 
the year ended 31 December, 2007. There should be information related to corporate governance structure within the 
company for the year 2007. To meet the first criterion 17 companies were excluded and then 53 companies were 
excluded to meet the second criterion. Hence, the final sample contained 75 companies. 
4.2. Disclosure Checklist 
To meet the purpose of this study the researcher uses a self-constructed disclosure checklist based on the IFRSs 
required to be followed by the IASB in preparing the financial statements for the fiscal year beginning January 2007 
and which are mandated in the Egyptian context. The disclosure index employed in this study includes 275 IFRSs 
based itemsb. The disclosure index for each company was calculated as the ratio of the total actual score awarded to 
the maximum possible score of relevant items applicable for that company. The calculation of the disclosure index 
(dependent variable) for each company under this approach is as follows: 
DI = ADS/ MD         (1) 
Where: 
DI refers to the disclosure index (0≤ DI≤1). 
ADS refers to the aggregate disclosure score for a particular company. 
MD refers to the maximum score possible for that company. 
4.3. Data Collection and Regression Model 
The data on the chosen independent variables (see below) were obtained from Egypt for Information Dissemination 
Company (EGID). The following multiple regression model is proposed: 
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Yj= β0+ β1 board independencej + β2 board leadershipj + β3 board sizej + β4 government ownership ratioj + 
β5management ownership ratioj + β6 private ownership ratioj + β7 public ownership ratioj + β8 total assetsj + β9 
return on assetsj + β10 debt to equity + β11quick ratio + β12 type of business activityj + β13 type of audit firmj + Ɛj 
 
Where: 
Yj= Disclosure index for companies (j=1,…, 75) which denotes the dependent variable. 
β0= The intercept. 
Ɛj= Error term. 
 
The independent variables consist of seven test variables (board independence, board leadership, board size, 
government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private ownership ratio and public ownership ratio) and six 
control variables (firm size [proxied by total assets], profitability [proxied by return on assets], gearing [proxied by 
debt to equity], liquidity [proxied by quick ratio], type of business activity, and type of audit firm). Due to the non-
normality of distribution of dependent and independent variables, it was decided to use non-parametric tests and to run 
the regression analysis using normal scores as transforming data is a recommended approach in order to modify their 
distribution to look more normal (Field, 2005)c. 
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Extent of Compliance with Mandatory IFRSs 
 
The results of the analysis of the 75 annual reports of companies listed on the EGX are demonstrated in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Extent of Compliance with Mandatory IFRSs by Companies Listed on 
the EGX. 
 
Country Min. % Max. % Mean % Std. 
Deviation 
Percentage of 
companies above 50% 
Number of companies  
above 50% 
Egypt 68 91 80 0.04 75 100 
 
Table 1 shows that the average level of compliance with the IFRSs disclosure requirements by non-financial 
companies listed on the EGX is 80%. The minimum level of compliance was 68% and the maximum level was 91% 
implying that none of the companies listed on the EGX achieved full compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. Hence, de facto compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context is 
problematic although the requirements under the ECCG and Capital Market Law mandate full compliance with IFRSs 
requirements. In most of the cases low compliance levels may be attributed to the preference for secrecy, fear of 
competition, low non-compliance costs, and weak monitoring. Lack of awareness of the importance of compliance and 
improved transparency among management of the majority of listed companies are also potential reasons for lack of 
full compliance with some requirements. Compared to the findings of a more recent study that was conducted on the 
best performing 15 companies listed on the EGX for the fiscal year 2004 (Dahawy, 2007), a significant increase is 
seen in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. The average level of compliance reported by 
Dahawy and Conover (2007) was 62% (compared to 80% in this study) with the minimum compliance level 52% 
(compared to 68% in this study) and the maximum 76% (compared to 91% in this study). This difference may be 
attributed to the use of a more comprehensive disclosure index, and a much larger sample in this study and/or the 
relative improvement in the monitoring and enforcement functions of the CMA in 2007 (the year of this study) 
compared to 2004 (the year of Dahawy and Conover’s study). However, this disparity supports the proposition that 
overall progress in compliance levels in the Egyptian context may be a positive sign that the national norms are 
moving towards compliance but that more time is needed for certain disclosure requirements to become part of the 
culture of Egyptian corporate management. Thus, progress in compliance levels can be observed over time. That said, 
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stringent enforcement and strict punishment would foster full compliance much swifter and overcome the existing 
barriers to full compliance with IFRSs. 
5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
Table 2 shows that the ratio of independent non-executive directors on the BOD of Egyptian companies ranges from 
0% to 100%, meaning that the BOD of some companies listed on the EGX may consist entirely of executive directors 
or vice versa. However, on average more than 50% of the BOD members are independent which agrees with the 
recommendation of the OECD principles and that of the ECCG. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables. 
 
Independent Variable 
Egypt (N=75) 
Min.  Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Board Independence Ratio 0.00 1.00 0.5052 0.1928 
Board Leadership 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.503 
Board Size 3.00 9.00 5.17 1.855 
Government Ownership 
Ratio 0.00 0.98 0.1919 0.2964 
Management Ownership 
Ratio 0.00 1.00 0.1121 0.2361 
Private Ownership Ratio 0.00 1.00 0.2353 0.3231 
Public Ownership Ratio 0.00 0.86 0.1504 0.2429 
Company Sizea 624.0000 11388000 522139.500 1533462.4 
Profitability -0.30 0.31 0.1343 0.0838 
Gearing 0.01 2.22 0.6798 0.3995 
Liquidity 0.33 8.58 2.5580 1.5314 
Type of Business 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.479 
Type of Auditor 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.464 
 
In respect of board leadership, the CEO and the Chair positions are held by two different persons in 51% of the 
companies listed on the EGX. For board size, it ranges from 3 to 9 members, with an average board size of 5 
members. With respect to government ownership ratio, this ranges from 0% to 98% with an average of 19%. In terms 
of the management ownership ratio, this ranges from 0% to 100% with an average 11%. The private ownership ratio is 
seen to range from 0% to 100% with an average of 24%. Finally, with respect to public ownership, the ratio ranges 
from 0% to 86% with an average of 15%. The descriptive statistics of the control variables as in Table 2, show that the 
average firm size measured in terms of total assets is USD 522139.5 million. Profitability measured in terms of return 
on assets, indicates that the average profitability in companies listed on the EGX is 13%. The gearing measured in 
terms of debt to equity, averages 0.68. The average liquidity is very high (2.56). This implies the high ability of 
companies listed on the EGX to meet their short term obligations, which reflects the large margin of safety in 
companies listed on the EGX and their ability to continue as going concerns. This in turn has the potential to attract 
more direct foreign investments. Finally, the descriptive statistics of the categorical control variables as indicated in 
Table 2 show that 35% of the sample companies that are listed on the EGX are non-manufacturing. Also, it is 
recognised that 31% of the companies listed on the EGX are audited by non big 4 auditors. This implies that the 
majority of companies listed on the EGX (69%) are audited by big 4 affiliates. 
5.2. Univariate Analysis 
5.2.1. Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Continuous Independent Variables 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation between the overall level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements (total 
disclosure index) and continuous independent variables within the Egyptian context. Given that the results of the test 
Hassaan /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science Vol 2, No 1, 2013 ISSN:2147-4478 
15 
 
of normality for the total disclosure index show that P=.2 (P>.05), it was decided to double-check the results of the 
Spearman Rank Correlation (non-parametric test) using the Pearson Product-moment Correlation (parametric test). 
 
Table 3. Correlation between Total Disclosure Index and Continuous Independent Variables. 
 
Independent Variable 
Total Disclosure Index 
Spearman Rank Correlation Pearson Product-moment Correlation 
Correlation 
Coefficient (r) 
Significance 
(two-tailed) 
Correlation 
Coefficient (r) 
Significance 
(two-tailed) 
BOD Independence .072 .538 .008 .945 
BOD Size .052 .657 .066 .574 
Government Ownership .127 .277 .139 .235 
Management Ownership .031 .790 .019 .872 
Private Ownership -.013 .910 -.019 .871 
Public Ownership -.080 .493 -.152 .193 
Company Size .171 .143 .051 .666 
Profitability -.022 .850 -.087 .456 
Gearing -.122 .297 -.055 .642 
Liquidity -.003 .978 .042 .722 
 
As seen in Table 3, the results of both the Spearman Rank Correlation and the Pearson Product-moment Correlation 
support the non-existence of any significant correlation between the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements and continuous corporate governance test variables (P> .05).  
 
These findings support the second research hypothesis (H2: there is no significant statistical relationship between 
board independence and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This agrees with the findings 
of Haniffa (1999), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b). Compared 
with the findings of prior studies that investigated the association between corporate governance attributes and 
disclosure practices within the Egyptian context, these findings do not support those of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 
2011) which report a significant positive relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and board independence. 
With respect to the association between board size and compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements, 
these findings support the fourth research hypothesis (H4: there is no significant statistical relationship between board 
size and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This agrees with the findings of Lakhal 
(2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). Compared with the findings of prior studies that 
investigated the association between board size and disclosure practices within the Egyptian context, these findings do 
not support those of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) which report a significant positive relationship between voluntary 
internet disclosure and board size. 
 
The lack of correlation between levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements and either of 
board independence or board size within the Egyptian context, supports the proposition that the majority of board 
members in companies listed on the EGX do not carry out their responsibilities with respect to monitoring 
management behaviour properly, even when outside directors are recognised on the boards in the Egyptian listed 
companies, they lack material independence as generally, they are appointed to the board because of their close 
relationship with executive board members, the Chair or controlling shareholders. They may also lack experience or 
may have insufficient financial incentive to actively monitor management and protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. This lends weight to the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the Egyptian 
listed companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they meet the 
independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that such companies follow corporate governance best 
practices, and hence, gain respect, consequently the problem of decoupling will continue as companies will state that 
financial statements are prepared according to IFRSs while full compliance is absent). Furthermore, the predictions of 
agency theory and cost-benefit analysis (weak monitoring reduces monitoring costs and weak enforcement of IFRSs 
reduces non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance of secrecy, absence of 
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awareness regarding the importance of transparency and the lack of material independence by board members may 
support management’s selective disclosure to avoid competition and protect company reputation, even though the lack 
of disclosure is in breach of the mandatory requirements).  
 
With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 3 support hypothesis H5a (there is no significant statistical 
relationship between the government ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements). This result supports the findings of Naser et al. (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a). In addition, it supports that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be 
explained by the government’s ability to access all company information. Agency theory suggests that, this reduces 
the monitoring costs, and hence reduces management incentives to improve disclosure. Simultaneously, Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism all suggest that given the 
preference to secrecy the government may not encourage full transparency. This may be due to government’s intention 
to sell its shares in the company at a good price as part of the privatisation programme. Additionally, the lack of 
awareness and the absence of incentives for members of the public who are implicit owners of government shares 
discourage direct monitoring of the management (generally government officials) of government-owned enterprises. 
This contributes to the decoupling problem as companies declare their compliance with IFRSs, simply to gain respect 
and legitimacy, when in reality they are not complying.  
 
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with the overall IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 3 do not support H5b (there is a significant negative statistical 
relationship between the management ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements). Although, this result does not agree with the findings of the majority of prior studies investigating the 
association between management ownership and levels of disclosure, which support a negative relationship (e.g., Eng 
& Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008), and with that of 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010) in the Egyptian context, it supports that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011). This may be 
explained by reduced agency costs, and predictions  based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-
benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism that the secretive culture, lack of management awareness concerning 
the importance of transparency and compliance, absence of monitoring by board members or stock exchange 
regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders, encourage management to keep disclosure levels 
at a minimum as long as non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs. This in turn contributes to the problem 
of decoupling. With respect to the association between private ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 3 support H5c (there is no significant statistical relationship 
between the private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This result 
supports the findings of Suwaidan (1997), Depeors (2000), and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b); however, it does not support 
that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) with respect to voluntary disclosure practices in Egypt. This is probably 
attributable to ease of access to all company information by private investors who are in most cases actively involved 
in company management either as executives or as directors. Furthermore, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-
cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack 
of private investor awareness of the importance of transparency will not increase pressures by private investors on 
management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Furthermore, absence of monitoring from board members or stock 
exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders will reduce noncompliance costs; hence 
will not improve compliance levels with mandatory IFRSs. Consequently, this contributes to the problem of 
decoupling.  
 
Finally, with respect to the association between public ownership ratio and levels of compliance with overall IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 3 support H5d (there is no significant statistical relationship 
between the public ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This result 
supports that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a). However, it does not support the results of the majority of prior studies which 
support the existence of a positive association between public ownership and disclosure level (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In addition, it does not support the finding of 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008) in the Egyptian context. This result may be attributed to the reduced agency costs due to the 
lack of demand for more disclosure by naïve public investors in the Egyptian context. Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism propose that the secretive culture 
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causes management to avoid the outflow of stock market price-sensitive information. In addition, secrecy is also 
associated with large power distance and the tendency to collectivism (Gray, 1988). Furthermore, the lack of listed 
companies’ management and BOD awareness regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and of following 
corporate governance best practices to enhance transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the 
absence of materially independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public shareholders 
interests, cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that public shareholders in developing 
stock exchanges do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, thereby management is not stimulated to improve 
compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of decoupling escalates. In this respect, Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) 
argue that many public shareholders in Egypt are small investors who cannot form pressure groups like those in 
developed markets.  
 
Regarding the association between company size and compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the 
results reported in Table 3 do not support a significant association. This supports the findings of Ahmed and Nicholls 
(1994), Street and Gray (2002) and Aljifri (2008). In addition, this supports the findings of Samaha and Dahawy 
(2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be attributed to the similarity in compliance behaviour with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements among all companies listed on the EGX. Table 3 reveals that no association exists 
between firm profitability and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context, 
thereby supporting the findings of some previous studies (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006). In addition, it 
supports those of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the 
Egyptian context. This may be explained by the similarity in compliance behaviour among all companies listed on the 
EGX. With respect to the association between firm gearing and its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, Table 3 reveals that no association exists, thereby supporting research outcomes of some prior research 
(e.g.,Tower et al., 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). In addition, it supports those of Abd-
Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may 
be explained by the similarities in compliance attitude among all companies listed on the EGX. Finally, Table 3 
indicates that no association exists between firm liquidity and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context, thereby supporting the findings of Alsaeed (2005), Barako et al. (2006) and Al-
Akra et al. (2010a). In addition, it supports that of Abd-Elsalam (1999) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the 
Egyptian context. This may be due to the similarity among all companies listed on the EGX in their compliance 
attitude with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
5.2.2. Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Categorical Independent Variables 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to determine whether there are significant statistical differences between the two 
groups of companies that: separate the CEO and Chair positions and those that do not; carry out manufacturing 
activities and those that carry out non-manufacturing activities; audited by big 4 affiliates and those audited by non big 
4 ones. Table 4 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
 
Table 4. Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Categorical Independent Variables-Egypt. 
 
Disclosure Index Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Board Leadership 
Total Disclosure Index 
(Total Score) 
650.000 1353.000 -.562 .574 
Type of Business Activity 
Total Disclosure Index 
(Total Score) 
634.500 985.500 -.028 .978 
Type of Auditor 
Total Disclosure Index 
(Total Score) 
570.000 846.000 -.322 .748 
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With respect to the impact of board leadership, the Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in Table 4 show that, 
no statistically significant differences exist between the two groups of companies (i.e., in which the CEO and Chair 
positions are held by different persons, and those that do not) in the extent of compliance with the overall IFRSs 
disclosure requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.574). Consequently, H3: there are no 
statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements between companies 
that separate the positions of the CEO and Chair and those that do not, is accepted. This supports the findings of Arcay 
and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In addition, it supports those of Ezat 
and El-Masry (2008) that carried out in the Egyptian context. This can be mainly explained by the lack of material 
independence of the Chair in the Egyptian listed companies when the CEO and Chair positions are separated. This in 
turn lends support to the institutional isomorphism which suggests that, separating the CEO and Chair positions has no 
influence on board leadership independence, as long as there is no awareness regarding the importance of separating 
the positions of the CEO and Chair in improving the monitoring of management behaviour and hence the quality of 
financial reporting within the business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, 
is expected when the two positions are separated, and decoupling is thus expected to continue due to the existence of 
cultural barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of the two positions as recommended under the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In addition, companies may fall in line with the separation 
recommendations purely to gain respect and legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, the 
notions of agency theory and cost benefit-analysis would argue that given the secretive culture accompanied with lack 
of material independence of the Chair, weak monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of compliance, non-compliance 
costs will continue to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation between the CEO Chair positions 
will not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
 
With respect to the impact of the type of business activity (manufacturing/non-manufacturing) on the levels of 
compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in Table 4 
show that, no statistically significant differences exist between the two groups of companies in the extent of 
compliance with the overall mandatory disclosure requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 
(P=.978). This supports the findings of some prior research (e.g., Naser, 1998; Naser at al., 2002; Street & Gray, 
2002). In addition, it supports those of Ismail et al. (2010) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the Egyptian context.  
This may be attributed to the fact that companies listed on the EGX are the largest companies in their sectors and the 
most important vehicles in the development of the Egyptian economy, hence there are no differences in their attitude 
with respect to compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
 
Finally, with respect to the impact of the type of auditor (big 4/non big 4) on the levels of compliance with the overall 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, the Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in Table 4 show that, no statistically 
significant differences exist between the two groups of companies in the extent of compliance with the overall 
mandatory disclosure requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.748). This supports the 
findings of some prior research (e.g., Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; Street & Gray, 2002). In addition, this supports 
the findings of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. Given that none of the companies that are 
listed on the EGX achieved full compliance with the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, this implies that there is no difference between the quality of work performed by big 4 affiliates 
compared to non big 4 ones. Hence, this raises doubts concerning the quality of audit work performed by big 4 
affiliates that operate in Egypt. Some of these audit firms may not be strict as they may consider the companies to be 
operating in a developing market, and to require more time to adapt to the compliance culture in respect of IFRSs. 
Additionally, they may fear the prospect of losing the client should they issue qualified reports; and another possibility 
is that they may perceive their clients as the best of the worst and believe that issuing them with qualified reports will 
give an advantage to those companies with lower compliance levels but audited by non-big 4 audit firms. This 
supports the continuity of decoupling problem in the Egyptian context in two ways. Firstly, listed companies will 
continue claiming that their financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while full compliance is 
absent. Secondly, it seems that in most cases, listed companies engage with big 4 audit firms, paying expensive audit 
fees merely as window dressing to attract more investors or to avoid extensive monitoring by the disclosure 
monitoring staff of the CMA. 
 
The above discussion of the findings from the univariate analysis promulgates that none of the corporate governance 
variables has a significant association with the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
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requirements. This implies that the impact of corporate governance mechanisms that are recommended by the OECD 
principles and the ECCG is absent in the Egyptian context. For further confirmation a regression analysis was carried 
out using normal scores to investigate the joint effect of independent variables as will be seen in the next section. 
5.3. Regression results 
The regression model employed in this study failed to explain compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context. This implies that the compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on the EGX does not follow any pattern in relation to neither corporate governance 
related variables nor other company attributes under study in this research. From the researcher's point of view, the 
non-existence of a significant association between levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs requirements and any 
of the company attributes that are employed as control variables is a positive sign that generally all companies listed 
on the EGX have similar attitude with respect to compliance with mandatory requirements (i.e., compliance with the 
majority of the requirements is now part of their culture). However, the lack of significant association between 
compliance levels and any of the corporate governance related variables implies that, the influence of corporate 
governance best practice on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs in the Egyptian context is absent. This 
may be attributed to its novelty and the lack of awareness of the advantages of material compliance with its 
requirements in Egypt, meaning that as yet it is not part of the cultural values in the Egyptian context. 
6. Conclusion 
The disclosure indices of the 2007 annual reports of 75 non-financial companies listed on the EGX were tested for any 
association with corporate governance structures. The results indicated that the average level of compliance with total 
IFRSs disclosure requirements was 80%. However, the univariate and multivariate analyses revealed that the influence 
of corporate governance structure on improving the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements is absent. Hence, the introduction of corporate governance code that is based on the OECD principles in 
Egypt in 2005 did not achieve its potential. This result is consistent with the notions of the institutional isomorphism 
theory, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, and the financial economics theories. Such consistency adds to 
the theoretical contribution of this study which can be considered the first to provide a competent comprehensive 
theoretical foundation of financial disclosure practices in the Egyptian context as one of the transitional economies in 
the Middle East. 
 
References 
 
Abd-Elsalam, O. H. 1999. The Introduction and Application of International Accounting Standards to Accounting Disclosure 
Regulations of a Capital Market in Developing Country: the Case of Egypt. Ph.D. thesis, Herriot-Watt University, UK. 
Abd-Elsalam, O. H., and Weetman, P. 2003. Introducing International Accounting Standards to an Emerging Capital Market: 
Relative Familiarity & Language Effect in Egypt. Journal of International Accounting, 12, 63–84. 
Abdelsalam, O., and El-Masry, A. 2008. The Impact of Board Independence and Ownership Structure on the Timeliness of 
Corporate Internet Reporting of Irish-listed Companies. Managerial Finance, 34(12), 907–918.  
Abdelsalam, O.H., and Street, D.L. 2007. Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Corporate Internet Reporting by UK Listed 
Companies. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16, 111–130. 
Abdelsalam, O.H., and Weetman, P. 2007. Measuring Accounting Disclosure in a Period of Complex Changes: The Case of Egypt. 
Advances in International Accounting, 20, 75–104.  
Abed, S., Al-Okdeh, S, and Nimer, K. 2011. The Inclusion of Forecasts in the Narrative Sections of Annual Reports and their 
Association with Firm Characteristics: The Case of Jordan. International Business Research, 4(4), 264–271. 
Ahmed, K., and Nicholls, D. 1994. The Impact of Non-Financial Company Characteristics on Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 29, 62–77. 
Akhtaruddin, M. 2005. Corporate Mandatory Disclosure Practices in Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 40, 
399–422. 
Aksu, M., and Kosedag, A. 2006. Transparency and Disclosure Scores and their Determinants in Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Corporate Governance, 14(4), 277–296. 
Al-Akra, M., Eddie, I., and Ali, M.J. 2010a. The Influence of the Introduction of Accounting Disclosure Regulation on Mandatory 
Disclosure Compliance: Evidence from Jordan. The British Accounting Review, 42(3), 170–186. 
Hassaan /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science Vol 2, No 1, 2013 ISSN:2147-4478 
20 
 
Al-Akra, M., Eddie, I., and Ali, M.J. 2010b. The Association between Privatisation and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from 
Jordan. Accounting and Business Research, 40(1), 55–74.  
Al-Jifri, K. 2008. Annual Report Disclosure in a Developing Country: The Case of the UAE. Advances in Accounting 
Incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 24, 93–100. 
Alsaeed, K. (2005).The Association between Firm-Specific Characteristics and Disclosure: The Case of Saudi Arabia. Journal of 
American Academy of Business, 7 (1). September, 310-321.  
Al-Shammari, B., Brown, P., and Tarca, A. 2008. An Investigation of Compliance with International Accounting Standards by 
Listed Companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States. The International Journal of Accounting, 43, 425–447.  
Arcay, M.R.B., and Vazquez, M.F.M. 2005. Corporate Characteristics, Governance Rules and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure 
in Spain. Advances in Accounting, 21, 299–331. 
Barako, D.G., Hancock, P., and Izan, H.Y. 2006. Factors Influencing Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Kenyan Companies. 
Corporate Governance, 14(2), 107–125. 
Beasley, M.S. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Directors’ Composition and Financial Statement 
Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443–465. 
Belkaoui, A., and Kahl, A. 1978. Corporate Financial Disclosure in Canada. Research monograph of the Canadian Certified 
General Accountants Association. Vancouver.  
Brown, R.Jr. 2007. Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure. Catholic 
University Law Review, 57, 45–92. 
Cadbury Committee Report. 1992. Report of the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Tech. 
rept. Cadbury Committee, Gee. London. 
Cheng, E.C.M., and Courtenay, S.M. 2006. Board Composition, Regulatory Regime, and Voluntary Disclosure. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289. 
CIPE (2003).'Corporate Governance in Morroco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan- Countries of the MENA Region’. Middle East and 
North Africa Corporate Governance Workshop. The Center for International Private Enterprise.  
Dahawy, K. (2007). Developing Nations and Corporate Governance. The Story of Egypt. Working Paper. Available: 
http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/Content/Research?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=-6%2C5%2C-4: Accessed 25/2/2010. 
Dahawy, K., and Conover, T. 2007. Accounting Disclosure in Companies Listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Middle Eastern 
Finance and Economics, 1, 5–20. 
Denis, Diane, and McConnell, John. 2003. International Corporate Governance. Working paper. European Corporate Governance 
Institute. 
Depoers, F. 2000. A Cost-Benefit Study of Voluntary Disclosure: Some Empirical Evidence from French Listed Companies. The 
European Accounting Review, 9(2), 245–263. 
Desoky, A. 2009. Company Characteristics as Determinants of Internet Financial Reporting in Emerging Markets: The Case of 
Egypt. Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 9, 31–71. 
Eng, L.L., and Mak, Y.T. 2003. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 
325–345. 
Ezat, A., and El-Masry, A. 2008. The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Timeliness of Corporate Internet Reporting by 
Egyptian Listed Companies. Managerial Finance, 34(12), 848–867. 
Felo, A.J. (2009).Voluntary Disclosure Transparency, Board Independence and Expertise, and CEO Duality. Working Paper. 
Available: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1373942. Accessed: 15/2/2010.  
GAFI. 2007. Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance. Tech. rept. General Authority for Investment and Free Zones. Available: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/egyptiancodeofcorporategovernance_en.pdf. Accessed: 25/2/2010. 
Ghazali, N.A.M., and Weetman, P. 2006. Perpetuating Traditional Influences: Voluntary Disclosure in Malaysia Following the 
Economic Crisis. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15, 226–248. 
Glaum, M., and Street, D.L. 2003. Compliance with the Disclosure Requirements of Germany’s New Market: IAS versus US 
GAAP. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 14(1), 64–100.  
Gray, S.J. 1988. Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems Internationally. Abacus, 
24(1), 1–15. 
Gul, F.A., and Leung, S. 2004. Board Leadership, Outside Directors Expertise and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 23, 351–379.  
Haniffa, R.M., and Cooke, T.E. 2002. Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations. Abacus, 38(3), 
317–349. 
Healy, P.M., and Palepu, G. 2001. Information Asymmetry Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the 
Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405–440.  
Hassaan /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science Vol 2, No 1, 2013 ISSN:2147-4478 
21 
 
Ismail, T.H., Shehata, N.F., and Dahawy, K. 2010. Firm Characteristics Determinants and Disclosure Level in Emerging Market of 
Egypt’ in Ismail, T. (2010). Perspective in Accounting Practices: Corporate Disclosure, Performance, Governance and Risk 
Management.  
Jensen, M.C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 
48, 831–880. 
Lakhal, F. 2003. Earning Voluntary Disclosures and Corporate Governance: Evidence from France. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract\_id=500283. 
Mallin, C.A. 2009. Corporate Governance. 3 edn. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Muslu, V. 2005. Effect of Board Independence on Incentive Compensation and Compensation Disclosure: Evidence from Europe. 
Working Paper. Available: http://www.ssrn.com. Accessed:23/9/2009.  
Naser, K. 1998. Comprehensiveness of Disclosure of Non-Financial Companies Listed on the Amman Financial Market. 
International Journal of Commerce and Management, 8(1), 88–119. 
Naser, K., Al-Khatib, K., and Karbhari, Y. 2002. Empirical Evidence on the Depth of Corporate Information Disclosure in 
Developing Countries: The Case of  Jordan. International Journal of Commerce & Management, 12, 122–155. 
Naser, K., Al-Hussaini, A., Al-Kwari, D., and Nuseibeh, R. 2006. Determinants of Extent of Corporate Social Disclosure in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Qatar. Advances in International Accounting, 19(1–23).  
OECD. 2004. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD 
Publications. 
Owusu-Ansah, S., and Yeoh, J. 2005. The Effect of Legislation on Corporate Disclosure Practices. Abacus, 41(1), 92–109.  
Samaha, K. 2006. Compliance with International Accounting Standards: Some Empirical Evidence from the Cairo & Alexandria 
Sock Exchange. Accounting, Management & Insurance Review, Cairo University Press. 
Samaha, K. 2010. Do Board Independence and Audit Committees Motivate Disclosure on Different Corporate Governance 
Information Categories in the Annual Reports in Developing Countries? International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 206–225. 
Samaha, K., and Dahawy, K. 2010. Factors Influencing Corporate Disclosure Transparency in the Active Share Trading Firms: An 
Explanatory Study. Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 10, 87–118. 
Samaha, K., and Dahawy, K. 2011. An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance Structures and Voluntary Corporate 
Disclosure in Volatile Capital Markets: The Egyptian Experience. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance 
Evaluation, 7(1/2), 61–93.  
 
Suwaidan, M.S. 1997. Voluntary Disclosure of Accounting Information: the Case of Jordan. Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 
UK.  
Tricker, Bob. 2009. Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices. New York: Oxford University Press. 
UNCTAD. 2007. Review of the Implementation Status of Corporate Governance Disclosures: Case Study Egypt. Tech. rept. 
Available: http://www.unctad. org/en/docs/c2isarcrp7\_en.pdf. Accessed 25/2/2010.  
Wallace, R.S.O., and Naser, K. 1995. Firm-Specific Determinants of the Comprehensiveness of Mandatory Disclosure in the 
Corporate Annual Reports of Firms Listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 14, 
311–368. 
Zarzeski, M.T. 1996. Spontaneous Harmonization Effects of Culture and Market Forces on Accounting Disclosure Practices. 
Accounting Horizons, 10(1), 18–37 
